States commit wrongs that demand redress. In her recent book, Avia Pasternak considers the circumstances under which it is legitimate to impose the cost of redress upon the state’s citizens at large. Her answer is that it is legitimate to impose reparative burdens on citizens only when they participate in their state intentionally, specifically, when they intend to play their part in maintaining state institutions. The book thus has revisionary implications for current international legal practice, given reparative burdens are currently (...) imposed upon states no matter their internal relations. The book’s persuasive argument will be of interest not only to scholars of normative political theory and social ontology, but also international legal theorists. That said, its core claim that citizen participation must be ‘genuine’ would benefit from further specification through future scholarship. (shrink)

Rorty’s profound and challenging critique of contemporary philosophy is in several ways somewhat unfair. Analytic philosophy can contribute towards ‘wisdom’ in a reasonable sense of the term, though not in Rorty’s narrow sense; and his contrast between ‘sophist’ and ‘sage’, with the latter understood in Plato’s way, is also too constricting. Also, some contemporary ‘analytic’ work in the ‘history of philosophy’, so called, is not invalidated by Rorty’s strictures - especially his implied accusation that we shan’t be interested in the (...) intellectual past if we can’t look down on it. (shrink)

An intensional logic is presented and suggested as a framework for a formal investigation of learning. The framework allows for discussing and comparing concepts and representations, and makes it possible to view learning processes as iterations of a certain type of functions. It is shown how this framework may be used to shed light on Meno’s paradox, but also on concepts such as Vygotsky’s ZPD and learning trajectories. In the case of mathematics, where there are recent attempts to merge ideas (...) from the philosophy of mathematics with ideas from the philosophy of education, a formal framework such as the one presented here, may constitute a common arena of discussion. (shrink)

Attempts have been made to analyse features in mathematics within a social constructivist context. In this paper we critically examine some of those attempts recently made with focus on problems of the objectivity, ontology, necessity, and atemporality of mathematics. Our conclusion is that these attempts fare no better than traditional alternatives, and that they, furthermore, create new problems of their own.

Recently Carrie S. Jenkins formulated an epistemology of mathematics, or rather arithmetic, respecting apriorism, empiricism, and realism. Central is an idea of concept grounding. The adequacy of this idea has been questioned e.g. concerning the grounding of the mathematically central concept of set (or class), and of composite concepts. In this paper we present a view of concept formation in mathematics, based on ideas from Carnap, leading to modifications of Jenkins’s epistemology that may solve some problematic issues with her ideas. (...) But we also present some further problems with her view, concerning the role of proof for mathematical knowledge. (shrink)

Although we frequently acquire knowledge and skills through social interactions, the focus of most research on learning is on individual learning. Here we characterize Interaction Based Learning, which represents the acquisition of knowledge or skill through social interactions, and compare it to Observational Learning —learning by observation. To that end, we designed a movement synchronization paradigm whereby participants learned Tai-Chi inspired movement sequences from trained teachers in two separated sessions. We used a motion capture system to track the movement of (...) 40 dyads comprised of a teacher and learner, who were randomly divided into OL or IBL groups, and calculated time-varying synchrony of three-dimensional movement velocity. While in the IBL group both the learner and the teacher could see each other through a transparent glass, in the OL group dyads interacted through a one-way mirror, such that the learners observed the teacher, but the teacher could not see the learners. Results show that although the number of movements recalled was not different between groups, we found improved movement smoothness in the IBL compared to the OL group, indicating movement acquisition was better in the IBL group. In addition, we found that motor synchronization levels in dyads improved over time, indicating that movement synchronization can be learned and retained. In the first session, the IBL group, but not the OL group, showed a significant improvement in synchronization. This suggests that dyadic interaction is important for learning movement sequences, and that bidirectional communication of signals and mutual feedback are essential for the consolidation of motor learning. (shrink)

In a recent article Matty Häyry observes that human reproduction is both irrational and immoral1; hence, he suggests, those who seek help before conceiving, “could be advised it is all right not to have children”. Häyry believes that if prospective parents are told that “according to at least one philosopher it would be all right not to reproduce at all” this could empower people “to make the rational choice to remain childless”; valiantly, he suggests himself as “the one philosopher to (...) be blamed for this unpopular idea”.In a rejoinder to Matty Häyry, Søren Holm claims it is not strongly irrational to have children2; S Aksoy contends that having children is the biggest dream of many married couples, and “the major goal in a couple’s life”3; Rebecca Bennet, accepts that human reproduction may be irrational but in most cases she thinks this is morally defensible.4Matty Häyry does not need my help to defend himself; I will …. (shrink)

Lajevardi and Salehi, in “There may be many arithmetical Gödel sentences”, argue against the use of the definite article in the expression “the Gödel sentence”, by claiming that any unsound theory has Gödelian sentences with different truth values. We show that their Theorems 1 and 2 are special cases (modulo Löb's theorem and the first incompleteness theorem) of general observations pertaining to fixed points of any formula, and argue that the false sentences of Lajevardi and Salehi are in fact not (...) Gödel sentences. (shrink)